‘Little Moscows’ in Western Europe: the ecology of small place communism

Abstract
Small communist strongholds were commonly nicknamed ‘Little Moscow’, both in Britain and in Europe. Small place communism was widespread since the interwar period, often in distinct hostile surroundings. In this article, based on research in a number of cases in Western-Europe, I look for common characteristics which might explain their receptivity for communist policies and ideas. My aim is to present a taxonomy for further research. Most of these places were isolated, recently developed and mono-industrial. They were populated by a wave of migrants, who had formed mono-occupational, pioneer societies. Second generation migrants turned to communism and build ‘occupational communities’ based on trade unions and other associational activities. Often they continued militant traditions of earlier socialism, anarchism, or syndicalism; others had a tradition of irreligiousness or religious indifference.

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‘Little Moscows’ in Western Europe: the ecology of small-place communism

The existence of ‘Little Moscow’ was an attempt, often deliberately, to create a counter-community within an existing one ... ¹

C’est bien davantage l’élaboration d’une contre-société, d’une contre-culture qui a permis à terme la victoire en proposant un modèle alternatif.²

S’il est un trait remarquable, repérable en divers points du territoire national, c’est bien la propension du communisme à se bâtir des bastions dans les terres pauvres.³

Pourquoi vote-t-on communiste dans tel village et pas dans tel autre, seulement distant de quelques kilomètres?⁴

In 1950 the small agrarian village of Finsterwolde in the Northeast of the Netherlands (pop. 3,250) gained some notoriety in the United States as ‘Little Moscow’, when weekly *Time* reported about the dissolution of its communist led municipal council.⁵ In 1951 it shared this cold war honour with the small French industrial town of Saint-Junien in the Limousin near Limoges (pop. 10,645), which figured in *Life Magazine* as an example of the communist menace in France.⁶ Described by *Life Magazine* as a *ville rouge*, its most militant neighbourhood was also known as *Petit Moscou*.⁷ Rural *bastions* in France were also named *Petit Moscou* or *Petite Russie*.⁸ In Great-Britain, the nickname ‘Little Moscow’ was commonly used for small communist strongholds, mostly in a derogatory sense, as Stuart MacIntyre showed in his *Little Moscows: Communism and Working-class Militancy in Inter-war Britain*.⁹ In 1926, during the General Strike, the *South Wales Daily News* ran a report on
the communist dominated Welsh mining community Mardy under the heading “Little Moscow: Lawless Mardy – Red Reign of Terror”. The designation *Moskauer Gesellschaft* for the German mining town of Penzberg in 1933 by the Nazi’s was also certainly not meant as a compliment. 

Communists themselves preferred to label this kind of localities ‘red’, both in Britain and Europe, like *Seraing la Rouge* in Belgium near Liège, *Halluin la Rouge* (also designated as *la Moscou du Nord*) in France at the Belgian border near Tourcoing/Roubaix, or *das rote Mössingen* in Germany south of Stuttgart, just as they advertised metropolitan strongholds: *der rote Wedding* (Berlin), ‘red Clydeside’ (Glasgow), ‘red Poplar’ (London), or *la banlieue rouge* (Paris). According to Michel Hastings

L’adjectif rouge, si jalousement accolé au nom des bastions communistes, suscite un sentiment de fierté chez des populations souvent victimes d’un pesant anonymat social. Il constitue un signe de ralliement. Par un sort de phénomène d’assimilation et de mimétisme, la société ouvrière est invitée à revêtir la tunique de gloire dont se drape la commune et à jouer le rôle que lui assigne la légende en marche. Un véritable travail de socialisation par l’imaginaire s’effectue grâce à la promotion d’une image de marque, d’une appellation contrôlée …

Small-place communism, both industrial and agrarian, can be found all over Europe since the interwar period, based on a *communisme identitaire* as Hastings aptly typifies Halluin’s communism. One could argue, as John Foster did for Britain’s ‘Little Moscows’, that these were only extreme examples of working-class militancy in many parts of Europe after World War I, but this begs the question why some places became, and remained, more communist prone than others. Moreover, not all strongholds emerged from the post war turmoil; in fact
the timing of communist implantation could differ substantially. In Britain the General Strike (1926), and in France enthusiasm for the communist party connected with the Popular Front (1934-36) and the Libération (1945-46) proved to be important as well. Timing should, in my view, be part of the explanation.

In a social history of British communism, based on extensive prosopographical research, Morgan, Cohen and Flinn have argued that local communist attachments resulted from a “multiplier effect whereby the establishment of an effective party presence would itself then attract new recruits from environments hitherto untouched by communism”. This “snowball effect […] might help explain the extremely localized pattern of communist implantation”. Some pages later they repeat: “it is […] quality of leadership, in the sense of personal example, capability and articulacy, that best explains the more localized variables of communist implantation in Britain”. Of course, local politics always requires personal activism and agency, and electoral results do also depend on the availability of popular and respected candidates, but for me this kind of reasoning is not really convincing. It cannot explain why some communities proved more receptive for alignment with communist leadership than others, and why some developed into such persistent local strongholds. In my view, the explanation must be sought in specific features, in sociological terms the ecology, of these local counter communities. In this paper, based on research in a number of cases in Western-Europe, I want to look for common characteristics which might explain their receptivity for communist policies and ideas. As possible factors I singled out: their geographical situation, occupational structure, immigrant participation, religious attitudes, militant traditions, and communist sociability. My aim is to present a taxonomy for further research, based on an inventory of similarities as possible explanations.

A more substantiated ecological methodology to analyse local differences in political affiliation would perhaps correlate local election results with explanatory factors of the like
mentioned above. Laird Boswell did this in his research on communist implantation in the French Limousin and Dordogne regions, but for a variety of reasons this is hardly feasible on a European scale. I used a more intuitive approach, based on a comparison of a selective number of cases depending on the availability of local investigations published in the past thirty years or so. If possible, I will also refer to other instances that are less well researched. An overview is presented in table 1; their geographical situation is indicated at map 1.

Admittedly, a selection of cases on the basis of studies available has some serious methodological shortcomings. How to define a small place? My cases range from agrarian villages of 2,000-3,000 to industrial townships of about 10,000 inhabitants. Contexts could be quite different, and have to be taken into account. Is it feasible that communist success in such different kind of communities can be explained by the same kind of explanatory factors? Is there really a specific kind of ‘small place’ communism as compared to communism in big cities? How to find out, if big cities are not in my sample? It is also clear that this rather disparate collection of cases is not sufficient to decide whether characteristics of the places concerned can be considered necessary or sufficient conditions for communist success. This can be only be resolved by comparing with other small places which did not have a significant communist presence, or were dominated by other political currents, like social-democracy. I am aware of these methodological problems, but my approach based on existing literature about individual places has the one big advantage that it enables me to gather thorough information on cases in several countries. In this way different national research traditions could be combined.

This criterion privileged France, not only because for a long time the PCF proved to be one of the most successful communist parties in Western Europe, but also because of the French tradition of research on the regional implantation of the PCF that started in the 1970s with studies by communist historians of the Institut Maurice Thorez, and has been expanded
by historians around the journal Communisme, founded by the doyen of French communist history, Annie Kriegel.27 In France I selected five cases. I already referred to the glove making town of Saint-Junien near Limoges and the textile town of Halluin (la Mecque, la ville sainte du communisme28) in the far North at the Belgian border. Sallaumines in the coal mining basin of Pas-de-Calais is also a case in point, as are the peasant community of Tarnac representing the communist villages in the northern Corrèze, and Villerupt as an example of the Lorraine iron mining communities in Meurthe-et-Moselle at the Luxembourg border near Longwy. The last area is particularly interesting as the PCF succeeded to conquer these communities only after World War II, in contrast to the others, which all date from the interwar years.29 In Britain I chose the well-researched case of Mardy in the Rhondda (South-Wales), and refer where possible to other ‘Little Moscows’ mentioned by MacIntyre: the mining village of Lumphinnans in Fife (northeast of Edinburgh, Scotland), and the textile communities in the Vale of Leven (near Glasgow).30

In Germany, the work of Klaus Tenfelde is important. In his study of the mining township of Penzberg, near the Austrian border in Ober-Bayern, he introduced the concept of punktuelle Industrialisierung (‘isolated industrialization’).31 Later he expanded and generalized the argument: “wherever industrialization happened [in] one single industrial community, similar signs of militancy and tensions within the environment could occur”.32 The argument has been successfully applied to other German cases of small place communist implantation, especially in research connected with the resistance to the Nazi-dictatorship in this type of places after 1933.33 Apart from Penzberg, I selected the porcelain manufacturing town of Selb, also in Bayern, near the Czech border; and the textile town of Mössingen in Baden-Württemberg.34 While relative KPD strongholds, there was no communist majority at the polls before 1933 in any of these places. Chances of further gain, like in France, were cut off by Hitler’s rise to power. In the Netherlands, the communist dominated agrarian village of
Finsterwalde mentioned above is also a clear example. I have refrained from research in other European countries, both in the North (Scandinavia; Finland) and the South (Greece; Spain; Portugal; Italy), which would also have been very interesting from a local perspective.  

Local variations

Many of the places I have selected were situated in larger areas of communist implantation. For these regions one could argue, as Chris Williams did for the Welsh Rhondda Valleys mining district, that local communism was only a radicalized manifestation of regional militancy, or, the other way around, that regional communism radiated from local strongholds. In these cases the wider regional context has to be taken into account, but from a localized perspective this can result in a spatial illusion, as there were extreme local variations within these areas. In the Welsh communist stronghold of Rhondda East for instance, Mardy’s ‘Little Moscow’ contrasted sharply with the relative weakness of the Party’s presence just a mile or two away. The electoral history of the Fife ‘Little Moscow’ Lumphinnans presents a stark contrast to nearby Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly, at only a half hour’s walk, where the communists never outpolled the Labour Party.  

In the French Lorraine border region around Longwy/Villerupt after World War II communism gained the upper hand in iron mining communities only, and remained very weak in older boroughs and the central towns of Audun-le-Romain and Landres. Also, in Lorraine coal mining the communist following remained very weak. In the Corrèze department in the Limousin region, where the PCF generally scored high, there were several places where the right has done consistently well throughout the last century, like in the canton also called Corrèze, bordered on three sides by others (Seilhac, Treignac and Bugeat) that counted among the reddest in Corrèze and in France as a whole. The social structure in these cantons was
similar, however. The differences on village level could also be substantial: in the 1936 election the PCF obtained no votes in the Corrèze village of Meyrignac, while it received 36 and 54 percent in nearby Beaumont and Grandsaigne in that same year. There were also more gradual differences: of the Corrèze communist communities the village of Tarnac in the canton of Bugeat stood out as the champion: in 1924 73 percent of its votes went to the communist list; in 1936 the PCF even got 80 percent. Its successes in Tarnac cannot be separated from communist results in the canton of Bugeat as a whole, however. In the west of Limousin, its capital Limoges’ socialist majority contrasted with not too far Saint-Junien’s stubborn communism.

In the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais the PCF became well-established in the coal mining districts, more particularly those east of Lens, but its local implantation there was also very irregular. Sallaumines (near Lens) stood out already in the 1924 election with 30 percent of the votes, but in other mining communities in this area results were quite modest in the order of 2 to 3 percent. The Sallaumines adherence proved to be very loyal during the 1920s and 1930s, and in 1935 the PCF gained a majority there (as in the municipalities of Harnes and Liévin in the same district), but in adjacent Noyelles-sous-Lens the socialists held the lead.

Outside the mining area, the PCF gained a majority in its most northern communist bastion Halluin in the textile region of Lille-Roubaix from the early 1920s, but the town was politically isolated. Its twin town at the Belgian side of the border, Menin, remained a stronghold of Belgian socialism, although many of its inhabitants worked as frontier workers in Halluin’s textile mills. The neighbouring communities in the Vallée de la Lys at the French side of the border were very hostile toward communist Halluin. Politically it remained a citadelle assiégée. In this respect Halluin resembled the German border towns of Penzberg and Selb. Hostility towards das Kommunistennest Penzberg even resulted in the
murder of several socialists and communists by radicalized Nazi’s on the eve of liberation (29 April 1945). Before 1933, electoral results of the KPD in Penzberg fluctuated from a low point of 10.8 percent in 1928 to a high point of 44.1 percent at the Reichstagwahl of July 1932, while in the nearby mining town of Peißenberg the SPD held the upper hand, with fluctuating results for the KPD between 2.8 percent in 1928 to 19.1 percent in November 1932. Communist electoral results in Selb reached a steady, and in the wider border region and in Bavaria as a whole exceptional 30 percent during the 1920s and early 1930s.

Last but not least, the communist villages of Finsterwolde (39.4 percent for the CPN in 1937), its twin village of Beerta (32.9 percent), and (to a lesser extent) Nieuweschans (23.1 percent), situated at the German border in the far east of the Netherlands’ most northern province of Groningen, were alone among the other, more inland villages with socialist majorities, or - more surprisingly - villages with strong orthodox Calvinist leanings, like nearby Midwolda.

In sum, ‘locality’ was a major factor in communist implantation, both in isolation and within a militant regional environment. In the following paragraphs I will look for common characteristics of these places that may explain their exceptional political orientation.

**Crossing borders in the periphery**

Can we attach any significance to the fact that no less than five of my cases (Halluin, Villerupt, Selb, Penzberg and Finsterwolde) are situated at a state border? It is at least remarkable. This can be found in Sweden too, where places with the highest communist vote (above 35 percent in the period 1924-52) are situated either in the far west at the Norwegian border (Nyskoga; Vitsand), or in the far north at the Finnish border (Tärendö; Kiruna). These were isolated, irreligious frontier communities of forest workers. According to
anthropological border studies, people in borderlands often exhibit a subversive attitude towards the national state. Both the weakness of the state at the border and the opportunities of border crossing provide prospects for semi-legal acts and behaviour, both economically and socially. Moreover, border crossing can lead to a transformation of values and specific deviant border identities, both relational and confrontational vis à vis the other side. Though not a necessary condition or consequence, this subversive attitude and transformation of values could have made the inhabitants receptive to oppositional ideas like communism.

Perhaps, people who had come to work in border towns from the other side of the border had crossed it in a metaphorical and symbolic sense also. The KPD-leadership in porcelain town Selb counted many migrants who had arrived from nearby Saxony, Thuringia and Czechia before World War I. Commuting by porcelain workers from the Czechian border town of Asch (Aš), just a few kilometres from Selb, was quite common. Asch also had a sizeable communist electorate (39.9 percent in 1932). There were more isolated centres near the Czech border with a strong communist electoral base, like the glass manufacturing village of Frauenau (pop. 3,026 in 1933), known as das rotes Glasdorf or Bayerns rote Insel. The first generation of miners in Penzberg had arrived at the end of the nineteenth century from a mixture of nations belonging to the neighbouring Austrian-Hungarian Empire: Slovakia, Croatia, Bohemia, South-Tirol. In both Selb and Penzberg the border provided opportunities for illegal work during the Nazi-regime.

In some cases, cross border relations have clearly been of great importance for socialist and later communist implantation. The most obvious example is Halluin, where from the end of the nineteenth century socialism was introduced among (descendants of) Flemish migrants and cross border commuters by propagandists from the Flemish socialist home town Ghent (at a distance of only 60 kilometres). It fell on fertile ground:
Ces enfants de migrants flamands, parfaitement bilingues, citoyens français pour la plupart mais élevés dans le souvenir colporté et tenace de la grande «remue» de leurs parents, n’ont-ils pas, plus que d’autres, été réceptifs aux accents internationalistes? Ne se sont-ils pas transformé plus facilement que d’autres en promoteurs d’un idéal de «trans-frontaliérité»? ⁶³

It is no coincidence that Halluin’s Belgian twin border town of Menin became an early socialist stronghold in the same period. Contemporary observers noticed that Flemish frontier workers could literally distance themselves from the influence of the church and other authorities, had an independent mind, and were therefore accessible to socialist ideas.⁶⁴ That Menin did not follow the communist reversal of Halluin’s socialists after 1920 is another, though from a border perspective in fact very significant, matter. It foreshadowed a more general phenomenon of nationalization of electoral behaviour and communist success, also on a local level, in the years to come, especially after World War II, as Serge Bonnet argued in a comparative study of the communist vote in Lorraine and its border lands: while in all of the border districts on the Belgian side, from the North Sea to Luxembourg, the average communist vote reached 8 percent in 1950 and 6.4 percent in 1954, on the French side this amounted to 26.5 percent in 1951 and 27.1 percent in 1956.⁶⁵ Becoming a communist increasingly meant becoming a French communist.⁶⁶

At the Lorraine border, the post World War I revolutionary movement in the mining district in the south of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (in 1921 the ARBED steel works, just a kilometre across the border near Villerupt, were occupied) influenced the Lorraine workers also, perhaps facilitated by the cross border mobility of Italian migrants, among whom there were also who had participated in L’occupazione delle fabbriche in Italy in 1920.⁶⁷ In Villerupt “la conjunction des trois mots ouvriers, Italiens, frontière, font de la
The electoral breakthrough of Lorraine’s communism came only after World War II, however. The Luxembourg CP disappeared in the 1920s, but was refounded in 1928, after which it gained some success in the industrial south. After World War II, communist electoral support in the Luxembourg border town of Esch-sur-Alzette grew from 15.1 percent in 1954, 15.3 in 1959, 17.0 in 1964 to 22.0 in 1968, parallel to increasing communist support in the Lorraine communities at the other side of the border in the Longwy region. Both can be explained by the presence of voters of Italian descent, putting the nationalization of communist voting, mentioned above, in another perspective.

These ‘border cases’ can be considered extreme outcomes of a more general oppositional attitude in peripheral parts of emerging nation states since the nineteenth century, which were significant in the wider context of regional socialist and communist implantation. Although in the countries concerned communism was a major force in the metropolitan working class quarters of the capitals Amsterdam, Paris, London, Berlin, and after World War I also in Munich, almost all of my cases of small place communism were clearly situated in national peripheries, and this seems to be part of a more general pattern. The German KPD counted some of its most outspoken local strongholds in peripheral regions like Upper Silezia, Oberfranken (Bavaria), and the Ore Mountains (Erzgebirge in Saxony near the Czech border). Although geographically situated in the middle of France, the Limousin area, where several strongholds of the PCF could be found, was in fact peripheral in the political sense, and this was significant for the rise of both socialism and communism, as the historian of Saint-Junien, Vincent Brousse, argues: “sous une forme de périphérie intérieure, la marge géographique se transformant en marge politique, cette dernière accentuant la première.” The British mining districts - early strongholds of the Labour Party, which started its parliamentary representation before World War I from a regional base in the
coalfields\textsuperscript{75} - were situated in peripheral areas also, far away from the centre of British politics in the South-East.

**Pioneer societies, second generation migrants, and ‘negative integration’**

**In Great-Britain**

Within the British coalfields, communist communities might not have been more isolated than others, but this was certainly the case with Welsh ‘Little Moscow’ Mardy, situated “at the very top end of the Rhondda Fach, separated from the Rhondda Fawr and the Aberdare valley, on either side, by precipitous mountain slopes and almost enclosed in a bowl”.\textsuperscript{76} Before the 1920s, Mardy had been “a new and booming part of the Rhondda coal-rush”, attracting both Welsh and English immigrants since the opening of its collieries in the 1870s. It was distinctive, not only because of its geographical isolation, but also because of the “comparative lateness and swiftness of its growth”.\textsuperscript{77} Its workforce was mobile and variegated, and had only recently settled there.\textsuperscript{78} Between the 1870s and 1909, Mardy had grown from just a farm house to a settlement of 880 dwellings, housing 7,000 inhabitants, reaching nearly 9,000 by the end of the First World War.\textsuperscript{79} The *South Wales Daily News*, reporting on Mardy as ‘Little Moscow’ in 1926, wrote about “the young Communists of Mardy”, \textsuperscript{80} and these must have often been second generation immigrants, born in Mardy itself, like the notorious Arthur Horner (1894-1968), of English, not Welsh descent, later (1946-1959) to become nationwide leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).\textsuperscript{81}

Being a new settlement, only recently populated by migrants, seems to be a common characteristic of many of the communities in my sample. As a consequence, shortage of housing accommodation and overcrowding was reported in many of these boom towns.\textsuperscript{82}
‘Little Moscow’ Lumphinnans in Fife, Scotland, was erected in the 1850s and 1860s as a company settlement by a coal company; its population increased from 404 in 1871 to 1,007 in 1891 and doubled again over the next decade. And although the society in the Vale of Leven was older, larger and more complex than the mining villages of Mardy and Lumphinnans, its employers had established new extensive tenement accommodations for their workers in two of the main settlements, similar to the mining villages mentioned above.

**In Germany**

The cross-border migration to the German border towns, mentioned above, can be related to a fairly recent economic upsurge in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. There were only a few farmsteads in Penzberg at the middle of the nineteenth century; workers’ housing was erected here by the mining company from the 1870s, and, together with the mining labour force, Penzberg’s population grew from 1,620 in 1880 to 4,000 in 1910, attracting migrants from a range of neighbouring countries. After the turn of the century, the town grew primarily by natural increase. This effected the age structure significantly: this was a relatively young community. As a consequence, most miners recruited in the 1920s were born in Penzberg itself, and this is reflected in the KPD-leadership in the 1930s, who were also mainly born there, most of them around 1900. In 1932 all party members were below forty years of age. Tenfelde writes about a radicalization of this generation, building up after World War I. Judged by the demographic history of the place, these must have been second generation migrants. In nearby Peißenberg, where the KPD remained much weaker, almost all miners originated from miners’ families in the town itself.
The porcelain industry in Selb had been established there in the 1850s, but only developed at a moderate pace until the 1890s, when a sudden expansion started. Like Penzberg, Selb at first experienced a high rate of immigration, but even before World War I the birth rate began to determine its population growth. So, again like in Penzberg, its population was relatively young.\textsuperscript{91} Mössingen seems to represent an exception in this respect. Its textile factories, established since the 1870s, were able to recruit workers from proto-industrial families in the village itself: until the First World War 90 percent of its population was \textit{ortsgebürtig}.\textsuperscript{92}

According to Georg Goes, who compared the political attitudes of four glass- and porcelain towns in southeast Germany, communist preponderance was related to a late industrial development: “Spätere Gründungsdaten, bzw. Neue Fabrikgründungen [...] sind Merkmale von überwiegend kommunistisch wählenden Industriegemeinden”.\textsuperscript{93} Hartmut Mehringer, in his study on the KPD in Bavaria, also related the implantation of the KPD in several specific areas to late industrialization in isolated industrial communities:

\begin{quote}
Die industriellen Unternehmungen in diesen Regionen waren vielfach junge, d.h. relativ spät gegründete Betriebe, die häufig isoliert in einem überwiegend agrarisch strukturierten Umland angesiedelt waren; die Arbeiterchaft rekrutierte sich teils aus der Tagelöhner- und Kleinbauern-Bevölkerung des Umlands, teils wurde sie aus außerbayerischen Industriegebieten in diese Regionen verpflanzt.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

\textit{In France}

\textit{Saint-Junien}
This pattern can also be recognised in the small French industrial towns and villages with communist majorities. *Petit Moscou* Glane, part of Saint-Junien, had experienced a transformation from an agrarian village to an industrial neighbourhood in the 1860 and 1870s, and a rapid population increase at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, partly by immigration from the surrounding countryside, reaching a maximum in 1921.⁹⁵ Saint-Junien as a whole grew in the same period, especially at the end of the nineteenth century, from 8,153 inhabitants in 1876 to a maximum of 11,432 in 1901, “par des paysans pauvres des campagnes environnantes affluent cette ville pour s’embaucher principalement dans la mégisserie”.⁹⁶

*The Longwy region*

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Longwy region in the northeast of France had been “un petit canton rural; peu peuplé, composé de quelques dizaines de villages autour d’un chef-lieu qui ne compte guère de plus de 2,000 habitants”.⁹⁷ In 1861, Villerupt counted 561 inhabitants.⁹⁸ The area was rather isolated from the rest of France,⁹⁹ and this was accentuated after the German annexation of a part of Lorraine in 1870, when the French-German border was drawn just east of Villerupt: “Le bassin de Longwy qui était déjà une enclave en terre étrangère, devient […] une véritable «presqu’ile»”.¹⁰⁰ The region’s first industrial development dates from this period, but shortly after 1900 a real industrial euphoria started, when new layers of high quality iron ore were discovered. Mining suddenly expanded, as did steel manufacturing. Labourers were recruited from the surrounding countryside, from across the Belgian border, and from Italy, the last ones almost exclusively to work in the iron mines: “les mines – qui se multiplient avec la mise en exploitation intensive du basin en 1902 – deviennent, chaque jour d’avantage, un univers d’Italiens”.¹⁰¹ The growth continued until 1930, with migrants from many countries, but still mainly Italians. In 1928, Villerupt counted
21 nationalities in a population of around 10,000. Some fifty years before, in 1881, it had only 1,226 inhabitants, exploding to 8,569 in 1911. The region as a whole can be characterized by “une juxtaposition de cités ouvrières autour de l’usine, composant des agglomérations monotones, […] dont la population totale excède rarement 10,000 habitants”. Migrants were concentrated in these cités, while the French continued to live in the old villages. It is in these banlieues sans villes, or parcs à main-d’œuvre, as Serge Bonnet called them, that communism found its strength, not in the village or urban centres like Longwy itself.

The end of immigration in the 1930s meant that a stable workforce emerged, composed of second generation Italians, who entered the mines and the steel works in this period. They were the basis of postwar communist success. Representatives of this second generation took the lead in implanting the PCF during the 1930s and, especially, during wartime Résistance. According to Noiriel, the Italian communists continued their fighting against Mussolini in fighting “pour la France”. For Italians of the second generation, adhering to the PCF was a means to accomplish their integration into France: “L’engagement de la deuxième génération dans la Résistance doit être rapporté à sa volonté d’effacer le stigmate de l’origine en prouvant une identité nationale contestée”. The result was, as Bonnet wrote in 1962: “Par bien des aspects, le militant communiste italien est le plus intégré, le mieux adapté, et même le mieux assimilé à la société locale. Il n’est pas exagéré de dire qu’il est un prototype d’assimilation, d’identification”. In the late 1950s and early 1960s les mairies of municipalities with a large Italian presence were conquered: Villerupt in 1959, somewhat later also Longlaville, Saulnes and Mont Saint-Martin near Longwy. In this way, as Serge Bonnet argued,
Le P.C.F. et les syndicats ouvriers assurent en Lorraine, la formation, la promotion et l’intégration de notables ouvriers, issus notamment des populations immigrées. […] Les micro-contre-sociétés ont un rôle intégrateur dans la société globale qu’elles prétendent détruire.¹¹⁰

The phenomenon has been described in the case of the German SPD before World War I as ‘negative integration’, and this seems to be an adequate term in this context also:

From the view-point of the historical participants this phenomenon may primarily appear as a matter of purposive isolation or self-containment, but from the viewpoint of the observer it can be recognized as a form of integration.¹¹¹

Second-generation communist recruitment connected to national integration has also been observed in Britain by Morgan, Cohen, and Flinn in the case of Jewish migrants in the 1930s:

Generally speaking, first-generation migrants either were not attracted to communism or else resisted absorption into the CPGB’s prevailing structures and priorities, which all too often seemed only too English. Conversely, where the party acted as a vehicle of politicization within Britain, second-generation minority groupings were more readily integrated.¹¹²

_Sallaumines and Noyelles-sous-Lens_

In the coal mining communities in Pas-de-Calais, continuous growth of production and employment in the mines between the 1860s and World War I had resulted in a steep increase of the population in both Sallaumines (a communist stronghold since the 1920s) and
Noyelles-sous-Lens (much less so), “nourri par les gens des campagnes environnantes du Pas-de-Calais et des régions plus lointains, de Kabylie [Algeria] et surtout de Belgique”.¹¹³ In the 1850s these had been little villages of 628 and 190 inhabitants respectively.¹¹⁴ There were important differences between these small mining towns, however: between 1851 and 1911 Sallaumines grew by 77.4 percent, Noyelles by ‘only’ 32.9 percent.¹¹⁵ While in most mining villages, and also in Noyelles, there was a distinction between “le village et les corons [miners colonies]; [between] le centre, autour de l’église, de la mairie, de l’école et des commerces [at the one hand] et les cités minières périphériques [at the other]”, this was not the case in Sallaumines:

Sallaumines c’est homogène, c’est tout mineur; une route nationale et, convergent sur elle, des rues bordée de corons miniers. Pas de centre visible, plus de village, aucune coupure apparente, fixée sur le sol. Les seules références structurantes de l’espace dans le discours des Sallauminois sont les fosses et la mairie.

In Noyelles, by contrast, there was

un noyau village très marqué: ce que certains appellent «l’ancien village», d’autres «le centre» et d’autres encore, significativement, «la ville», c’est moins un espace géographique précisément délimité qu’un groupe sociale dominant que plusieurs enquêtés appellent «les vieilles familles du village».¹¹⁶

In spite of their many resemblances, Sallaumines and Noyelles-sous-Lens differed by the speed of industrial development, population growth, and spatial restructuring. In Sallaumines new housing accommodation for miners’ families were erected in a forced rhythm, to keep up with demographic growth. Few remnants of the old village remained, the more so after its
destruction during World War I. Noyelles developed more gradually, without these effects on its spatial structure. The new miners’ quarters were separated from the old village, which kept its integrity, organized around the church as a symbol of traditional society.\textsuperscript{117} This effected social life (\textit{la sociabilité}) too. People from the village centre in Noyelles, being richer than those of the miners’ quarters, and therefore able to subsidize social activities, had the lead in local societies, but there was no \textit{sociabilité communal unificatrice}. In Sallaumines, of a \textit{tissu homogène centré sur les fosses}, all social activities depended on municipal subventions.\textsuperscript{118}

Post war reconstruction in the 1920s attracted new waves of migrants to the French coalfields, this time of Polish origin, both experienced miners arriving from the Ruhr (so called \textit{Westphaliens}) and from Poland itself. Both in Sallaumines and Noyelles two thirds of population growth in the 1920s was a result of Polish migration; in the 1920s almost half of the population were Poles. Until the 1930s net migration accounted for 62.4 and 67.9 percent of growth in both villages, but, like in the Lorraine, in the depression of the 1930s migration came to halt; many Poles were even sent home. While in the 1920s the first generation of Polish migrants lived and organized separately in \textit{véritable ghettos} in both communities, in the 1930s the Poles began to adapt to the different political milieus of each town. Social and political integration was only achieved by a second generation of Poles after World War II, however, when this generation, born in France, started their working life. In Sallaumines a rapid assimilation into the local community is reported, with mixed marriages, trade union militancy, estrangement from the Polish priest, political support for the PCF. In Noyelles, things developed differently: Polish inhabitants remained segregated in their isolated \textit{cités} and organized their own social life until the 1950s.\textsuperscript{119}

Arguably, the structural social differences between both mining villages can be considered part of the explanation of the difference in voting behaviour. In general, different political attitudes in mining communities in interwar Pas-de-Calais have been attributed to a
restructuring and renewal of the mining labour force before World War I in later to become communist localities. In Germany, a comparable political radicalization in the 1920s has been found in newly erected mining colonies at the northern fringe of the Ruhrgebiet, in contrast with the political orientation in the old village centres. The KPD could establish itself as a political force in the industrial quarters in this northern fringe, that were knocked up in the period of forced industrialization since the beginning of the twentieth century and were mainly populated by (Polish) migrants from the (then) Prussian east. A detailed study of election results in one of these colonies, Bottrop, makes clear that in the 1920’s the KPD “wag es gelungen das katholische, polnische Bergarbeitermilieu in Bottrop zu besetzen”. In Bottrop Polish miners from Upper-Silezia had settled from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Therefore, “lebten die Ruhrpolen schon zum Teil in der zweiten Generation an der Ruhr, wobei gerade die Oberschlesier in Bottrop die längste zeit in der Fremde verbracht und ganz zwangsläufig tiefe Wurzeln in der neuen Heimat geschlagen hatten”. While in the 1920s other Polish migrants had left for their now independent fatherland, or the coalmines in Pas-de-Calais, these ‘rooted’, second-generation Upper-Silezians had stayed in Bottrop, and formed the backbone of the KPD-electorate at that date.

**Halluin**

While the PCF gained a majority in Villerupt in 1959, and in Sallaumines in 1935, in its other northern stronghold of Halluin this already had been achieved in 1920. The socialist majority in its municipal council, chosen in 1919, adhered in its entirety to the Third International in 1920, and managed to hold this majority as PCF representatives in the elections to follow. Interestingly, the whole sequence of fast, but isolated industrial development, population growth predominantly by immigration, then stabilization, and political radicalization of the second generation, can be found in Halluin too, but in an earlier period. Its urban growth in
the nineteenth century was ‘disorderly’, according to Michel Hasting, especially between 1850 and 1870, when Halluin was ‘destabilized’ by the influx of Flemish migrants. As a booming textile town, it became one of the destinies of the waves of emigrants from ‘poor Flanders’ in the 1850s and 1860s. In the fifteen years between 1851 and 1866 Halluin’s population increased by an average of 10 percent annually from 5,408 to 13,673 inhabitants. At that time, it was the fastest growing town in the northern textile region as a whole. After 1866, growth slowed down, reaching a maximum of 16,599 in 1901. Thereafter, population stabilized, and later even diminished with some thousands. The presence of ‘strangers’ born outside of France (almost all Belgians) rose to about 75 percent in the late 1880s/early 1990s (much higher than in other northern textile towns), but after that it quickly fell until it reached about 25 percent after World War I. A process of indigenization is clearly visible: Halluin’s interwar inhabitants were mostly born out of second or third generations of Belgian descent. Belgian commuters from Halluin’s twin border town of Menin kept arriving to work in Halluin’s textile factories until the 1930s, however.

Unsurprisingly, the labour movement in Halluin had a distinct Flemish ‘flavour’ from its beginnings at the turn of the century, as can easily be deducted from the names of the early socialist and trade union leaders: Vanlaecke, Muleman, Vansielegehem, Verkindere, Goerland, Vandewattyne, Vanoverberghe, Vansteenikiste, Vandeputte, Desmettre. Many of them were to become communists in 1920. On the basis of a sample of 28 militants, known in 1912, Hastings concludes that at that time they were relatively young (in their 30s). Three quarters had been born in Halluin from parents born elsewhere, the others had arrived from small Belgian villages in the neighbourhood. So again, these were predominantly second generation migrants. Like in the case of communist voting by an integrating Italian electorate in the Lorraine after World War II, there is a clear correspondence between the presence of more and more settled and naturalized Flemish migrants, and the rise of socialism in Halluin before
World War I. Like Serge Bonnet, Hastings considers “le vote socialiste des fils de migrants” as an “action assimilatrice”: “Fondateurs et militants des premières organisations socialistes, les Flamands de la seconde génération en deviennent les électeurs”. 130

A sample of 96 communist militants in 1925 confirmed their flandamidade: 84.2 percent had been born in the town itself, but 82 percent had Belgian parents, and can be considered second or third generation. This corresponded with the composition of elected working class members in the municipality: 90 percent were born in Halluin; 88 percent were of Flemish descent, a clear sign of successful integration and the integrative role of the PCF. 131 With Michel Hastings, we may conclude: “Halluin la Rouge est l’aventure d’un communisme générationnel, comme celui de Longwy étudié par Gérard Noiriel”. 132

Isolated occupational communities, trade unions, and communist sociability

Occupational coherence

Halluin’s communists did not represent the local society as a whole, but only its working population. There is a clear connection with the typical composition of the industrial working class of Halluin: in the sample of 28 militants in 1912, 65 percent were employed as weavers in one of the textile mills of the town. In 1925 this was even 81.8 percent, higher than in the population as a whole, a clear sign of the occupational coherence of communist militancy. 133 One of the more salient features of my ‘Little Moscows’ is, indeed, that they were all dominated by specific industries, and in many cases this was reflected in the social profile of party members and militants. However, this was not necessarily so. In the other textile towns in my sample – the Vale of Leven in Scotland and Mössingen in Württemberg – leading communists did not primarily come from the body of factory workers. The leading figures in
Mössingen’s labour movement (both KPD and SPD) in the 1920s were craftsmen in the woodworking and building trades. In the textile factories members were few, but this changed in the 1930s, when one third of the KPD membership, and almost half of the related Rote Hilfe were factory workers.\textsuperscript{134} In the Vale of Leven in the 1920s the CP lacked any base in the dominant dying and printing industry. Although in the 1930s this changed somewhat, the party’s chief strength lay outside the workplace. In this respect it differed considerably from Halluin, and also from British mining communities like Mardy and Lumphinnans. The sizeable non-working class element in the Vale meant that it lacked the same degree of social homogeneity and occupational identity.\textsuperscript{135}

Communist membership in other cases did to a large extent reflect local occupational specialisation. In 1920, almost all KPD-members in Selb were working in the local porcelain industry (both skilled and unskilled workers).\textsuperscript{136} In 1931 all leading communist figures in Selb were porcelain workers.\textsuperscript{137} In Frauenau, the KPD was the party of the glass workers, at least half of its candidates worked in one of the glass factories.\textsuperscript{138} In the Corrèze villages smallholding peasants formed the great majority of those who ran for office for the PCF. That peasants dominated municipal councils can be considered a reflection of the social composition of the communist electorate in these villages.\textsuperscript{139} The peasants often also managed to mobilize support from village artisans and shopkeepers, however.\textsuperscript{140} In Saint-Junien the PCF was based in the leather and glove making industry there,\textsuperscript{141} but the peasants in the town’s orbit also contributed to the Party’s success.\textsuperscript{142} In the agricultural village of Finsterwolde communism derived its strength from proletarian farm workers, opposed to the wealthy farmers in the village. The victory of the PCF at the municipal election in Villerupt in 1959 more than doubled the number of working class councillors (mostly steel workers) from 8 to 17 on a total of 27.\textsuperscript{143}
For the mining towns the occupational base is even more self evident. In Penzberg at least two thirds of the KPD members in 1931 were miners, and probably 80 percent were related to the mine or belonged to miners’ families.\textsuperscript{144} In Sallaumines 58.7 percent of the members of the municipal council in the period 1919-1935 were miners (against 28.4 percent in Noyelles-sous-Lens).\textsuperscript{145} The Sallaumines miners succeeded

à regrouper autour d’eux et des puits tous les habitants, mineurs et non mineurs. […]

Car la tâche que s’assignèrent les mineurs, militants syndicaux, responsables d’associations ou conseillers municipaux – socialistes jusque 1935 et communistes après 1935 – ne consistait rien moins qu’à convaincre la majorité des Sallauminois de la nécessité de leur identification au groupe minier.\textsuperscript{146}

\textit{Trade unions}

The occupational base of communism was mediated by local trade unions. In Saint-Junien, in the 1920s the labour movement was based on the radical trade union CGTU, dominated by workers in the glove industry: “Les travailleurs du gant ont, semble-t-il, pesé largement sur le destin des syndicats et dirigent la quasi intégralité des structures corporatives”.\textsuperscript{147} In Halluin, “le communisme est avant tout un communisme syndical. […] Le syndicalisme représente le vecteur de l’implantation communiste à Halluin, son Cheval de Troie, son antichambre”.\textsuperscript{148} Trade union strength in Halluin can be related to the industrial homogeneity of its working population, as was the case in the mining communities in my sample. In Sallaumines, working and living being more closely connected than in Noyelles, the miners’ union had much greater influence on daily life and village identity.\textsuperscript{149} In the Lorraine in the early 1960s, Bonnet noticed a close correlation between the advance of the trade union CGT in the iron
Regional trade union leader in the Meurthe-et-Moselle iron mines Alberto Balducci considered himself “cegétiste avant d’être communiste”. His attitude was in fact not so different from that of British mining leader Arthur Horner’s from Welsh Mardy, mentioned earlier. In communist strongholds in the British mining districts the union and not the party was often regarded as the main vehicle of political activism. According to communist trade union leader Will Paynter, the typical South Wales coalfield activist was a miner and trade unionist first, a communist only second. His activism was rooted in “the communities around the pit, the union branches were based upon it, hence the integration of pit, people and union into a unified social organism”.

Organized communist influence in Mardy in the 1920s was based on control of the local trade union committee (‘lodge’). Sectarian conflicts with the official union, the South-Wales Miners Federation (SWMF, or ‘Fed’), in the late 1920s, made Horner conclude that communists had to work inside the union to keep their local base. The CPGB strategy now became to work through the local ‘Fed’ organization. The position Arthur Horner was able to achieve in the South-Wales Miners’ Federation (he became president in 1936), found its counterpart in Lumphinnans miners’ communist leader Abe Moffat, who became president of the Scottish miners in 1942. Like in Mardy, local communist influence in Lumphinnans was rooted in trade-union militancy at the work place, in a situation of close identity of work and residence.

Trade union adherence has also been brought forward as an important factor in the success of agrarian communism in the French Corrèze department. The existence of an agricultural trade union, the Syndicat des Paysans Travailleurs, closely linked to the party, was an original characteristic of Corrèze’s communism. In no other French department did this union establish such firm roots during the interwar years, not even in other red departments of Limousin, like Creuse and Haute-Vienne. It was no coincidence that one of
the party’s main national peasant organizer in the 1920s, Marius Vazeilles, came from this area. According to Boswell, there were strong links between membership of the Syndicat and communist votes: the local presence of the union was an excellent predictor of solid Party support at the polls,\textsuperscript{159} for instance in Tarnac, one of the first villages in 1920 to create a union branch.\textsuperscript{160}

**Occupational communities and communist sociability**

Trade unions enabled communists to connect workplace experiences to local politics, and to transform these isolated, mono-industrial or agricultural localities into ‘occupational communities’. A ‘locality’ is just a place where people live together; it can become a ‘community’ when local networks of social relationships are established, with high levels of interaction among insiders and isolation from outsiders. In the social history of mining, the idea that miners in small settlements were a so-called isolated mass, forming an ‘occupational community’, is a familiar topic, more specifically in the context of miners’ strike propensity.\textsuperscript{161} It has been broadened to other characteristics of mining settlements as well.\textsuperscript{162} Sociological theories suggesting that differences in the degrees of social isolation and occupational homogeneity of working-class groups are major factors influencing variations in militancy, have the advantage that they can explain how experiences in the workplace were connected to social relationships in mono-occupational localities or neighbourhoods. However, to avoid the ‘ecological fallacy’ inherent in this reasoning, implying that we explain social behaviour by structure without agency,\textsuperscript{163} these factors can, in my view, only be related to small place communism if we consider the agency of both trade unions and other forms of communist sociability.
Both were important in a process of socializing with ‘our own kind’, the last ones because they also involved family members of the predominantly male occupational groups. As far as we have information on this issue, efforts to organize a separate social sphere in and for the local working class community were a defining feature of communist political culture. Social and cultural events embedded the party in everyday life, sustained local networks of sociability, and strengthened a sense of local identity. In Mardy, and in Rhondda East in general, in the interwar years the communists had “an inclusive culture”; one could “live and die in a world whose boundaries were defined by the Communist Party”. The local Young Communist League held weekly meetings and rallies. A sense of identity was developed by wearing badges or a red tie; one might be able to play in or watch a communist football team, and be buried at a communist funeral. Communists led sporting teams, a flute band, a women’s guild, Friends of the Soviet Union, Young Pioneers. In the Vale of Leven there were communist organized sport and musical events, evening socials and so on. The German labour movement in general, both SPD and KPD, had a very rich associational and festive culture. In Mössingen, for instance, “die örtliche Arbeitervereine – Arbeiterturnverein, Arbeiterradfahrerverein, Arbeitergesangverein – waren das Rückgrat der dörflichen Arbeiterkultur”, and this was not so different in other German cases. Competition between SPD and KPD sometimes led to strife and divisions, however.

In small Corrèze villages the Jeunesses Communistes regularly held bals rouges or bals populaires, others organized Noëls rouges. After 1934 this kind of communist-sponsored fêtes de village became increasingly common. By creating new networks of sociability, Boswell argues, the communists filled a gap, because in the Corrèze villages of heavy communist presence church-related sociability was often non-existent. A communist festive culture is to be found in other French places as well, adapted to local customs. In Halluin, festivities, celebrations, and processions were embedded in Flemish folklore, “en inscrivant la
fête dans une stratégie plus générale d’implantation partisane et de conservation du bastion municipal”.

In the Longwy region it was associated with an Italian festive style of music and dance to stir “l’enthousiasme pour un parti qui offre justement aux ouvriers de la deuxième génération la possibilité de s’investir dans la vie sociale locale”.

In the mining towns in Pas-de-Calais, local bals populaire or other festivities (ducasses) had clear political functions too: to promote the trade union, or other working class organizations; this practice had declined, however, after World War II.

In French municipalities administered by communists, associational life was to a great extent promoted and fostered by the municipalities themselves. In Halluin communists were very active in associated societies, clubs and circles, facilitated by the municipally sponsored Maison du Peuple.

In Sallaumines “les sociétés se placèrent, ou furent placées, sous l’égide bienveillante de la municipalité, pour garantir l’homogénéité de la communauté et sauvegarder l’identité minière”.

By municipal sponsoring, patronage of the church or the mining company in associations like brass bands or sport clubs could be avoided. In the Longwy region, the communist municipalities encouraged social participation by supporting associational activities; in Villerupt alone, in 1964 there were 56 municipally sponsored associations, for sports, youth, culture, social aid, and others. In this way, according to Noiriel, “le groupe ouvrier dominant s’intègre-t-il toujours davantage à la société locale par l’intermédiaire du PCF et de toutes les structures qui en dépendent”.

One form of communist sociability and militancy had a major influence on communist implantation in several cases: the organization of the unemployed in the interwar years. The industrial isolation and mono-occupational character made these places particularly vulnerable for the rise of unemployment in the 1930s; in a sense they became trapped as an unemployed ‘occupational community’, and this made the unemployed receptive of communist agitation on this issue. A rise of communist activities and adherence in connection
with unemployment is reported in the British cases of Mardy, Lumphinnans, and especially the Vale of Leven, the German towns of Penzberg and Selb, the Dutch case of Oost-Groningen.\textsuperscript{178} For the French communities in my sample, this information is lacking, perhaps because they were able to shift unemployment on to returning migrants (in the Longwy and Pas-de-Calais regions), or cross-border commuters (in Halluin).\textsuperscript{179}

**Religious indifference, militant traditions**

Considering the causes of small place communist success in the interwar years and after, we cannot ignore its prehistory before World War I. Two factors stand out: traditions of religious indifference, and of pre-communist militancy, sometimes closely related. There are in fact two types of local political prehistories: one of anarchism or revolutionary syndicalism, particularly in Finsterwolde, Sallaumines, Saint-Junien, Mardy, Lumphinnans, and another of Second International socialism in the German cases (Germany generally lacking a syndicalist past\textsuperscript{180}), Halluin (as an offspring of Flemish socialism), and rural communism in the Corrèze. Socialism had established a geographical base of support there before the communists inherited and strengthened it in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{181}

The religious history of the Corrèze department is particularly relevant for an explanation of local variations in socialist and later communist implantation. According to Boswell, detachment from catholicism and religious indifference was the best predictor of local communist success. Low rates of religious practice, hostility to religion, and the absence of the church on a local level, all proved favourable to communism.\textsuperscript{182} The remarkable differences in voting behaviour between the northern and southern parts of the Corrèze department, and also, as mentioned before, between the canton of Corrèze (where the communist electorate remained relatively small) and the surrounding cantons of Seilhac,
Treignac and Bugeat (dominated by the PCF) can be explained by, or at least correlates with differences in religious behaviour. These differences were not caused by the party’s presence, but predated communist implantation. The Corrèze department was already divided in a religious southern and indifferent northern part on the mountain plains, later to become communist strongholds, from around 1900. The cleavage was produced between 1900 and 1910. Compared to the adjacent Creuse and Haute-Vienne departments this was relatively late, however. Remarkably, socialist implantation predating the communist reversal was also later in the northern Corrèze than in Creuse and Haute-Vienne: it emerged quite suddenly after World War I, when the socialist SFIO obtained more than 50 percent of the votes in the canton of Bugeat (in 1919), for instance. Before the war, this had been less than 10 percent, much lower than in Creuse and Haute-Vienne.

How to explain these divisions and time lags? In the late nineteenth century, socialism in the Haute-Vienne had spread from its urban stronghold Limoges into the surrounding countryside, but it had not yet reached the isolated Corrèze villages. There, socialism and religious indifference had been influenced by a more direct link with Paris. Although Boswell refutes any statistical correlation between places of origin of migratory labour – traditional in Limousin - and communist implantation, it can nevertheless be argued that on this sub-regional level it was in fact very relevant. Migrant labour from the southern cantons of the Corrèze was less frequent, had different (often rural) destinations, and concerned other specializations than from the northern part. In the canton of Bugeat, to become the reddest in the Limousin and perhaps in France as a whole, where the PCF won 53.9 percent of the votes in 1928, and 61.4 percent in 1936, party veterans and parish priests were united in their opinion that temporary migrants had influenced both irreligiousness and political radicalization. Since about 1880 Bugeat migrant workers had acquired a new specialization as coachmen (cochers de fiacre) in Paris, while before they had been primarily sawyers.
(scieurs de long) in rural areas, and, according to Pérouas, this could have influenced their religious attitude. Priests of this canton considered it one of the main reasons for the decline of religious practice, as one priest complained in 1911: “Environ 90 % des jeunes gens vont à Paris, à 15 ans, comme cochers. L’émigration leur fait bien du mal”. One of the bad influences were the Paris newspapers, which the coachmen had time to read while waiting for clients, and also sent home; according to the same priest there were a “foule de journaux parisiens envoyés par les migrants”. This might be exaggerated, but there were new ideas to be discussed and to be gained in Paris. The priest of the central village of Bugeat wrote in 1920: “Les enfants s’en vont à Paris aussitôt après la première communion et la confirmation et ils reviennent tout changés … ces émigrants vont au plaisir, au luxe, à l’argent, aux idées nouvelles”. In 1921 he noted: “La paroisse est comme un faubourg de Paris […]”; some years later it had become like “un prolongement de la banlieue rouge de Paris”.

A correlation between localized a- or anti-religious attitudes since the nineteenth-century and communist implantation after World War I can also be found in the Oost-Groningen villages of Finsterwolde and Beerta. Since the 1840s prosperous and ultra-liberal farmers had dominated the Dutch Reformed Church in these pioneering non-nucleated polder villages (the last polder in this area had been reclaimed in 1819). They appointed modernist preachers and estranged the workers from the church in this way, in contrast to the neighbouring villages. In the 1890s the irreligiousness of the Finsterwolde working population was strengthened further by anarchism gaining a foothold there. In fact, like in other places to be discussed below, anarchism was the direct precursor of communism in the 1920s. Already in 1918 an earlier left splitting of the Dutch social-democratic party had called itself ‘communist’ (CPN) and could profit from anarchist enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution. Within a few years the CPN succeeded in attracting the former anarchist following, who began to participate in elections as communists and gained municipal seats.
there. The electoral breakthrough of communism in Finsterwolde came only after a prolonged strike of agricultural workers in 1929.

The northern French mining district around Lens was an early area of religious indifference as well. From the 1860/70s its eastern part had the lowest level of religious practice (Easter Communion) in the North, and perhaps in France as a whole. The opposition between the attitudes of the inhabitants of the traditional villages and the newly erected miners’ *corons*, mentioned before, was already visible at that time.¹⁹⁸ From the end of the nineteenth century, socialism and trade unionism were followed massively by *une classe ouvrière déchristianisée*, and in the beginning of the twentieth century anarchist groups sprang up here, especially in localities east of Lens.¹⁹⁹ In 1902 a militant anarcho-syndicalist miners union (since then: *le jeune syndicat*) broke away from the moderate reformist trade union, linked to the socialist SFIO (*le vieux syndicat*). Anarchism had a decisive influence in the *jeune syndicat*, which found its strongest base in the mining communities east of Lens as well.²⁰⁰ Named after their anarcho-syndicalist leader Benoît Broutchoux, *les broutchoutistes* created local sections in this part of the Pas-de-Calais mining district, in Sallaumines among others, but not in Noyelles-sous-Lens.²⁰¹ In the 1920s, membership of prewar syndicalist *jeune syndicat* was continued in the radical trade union CGTU, in spite of the uneasy cooperation of communists and syndicalists. This was also reflected in local differences: of the miners born between 1901 and 1920 who had entered the mines between 1915 and 1934, 44.4 percent had been member of the CGTU in Sallaumines, against 22 percent in Noyelles.²⁰² In general, implantation of the PCF in the 1920s in this area succeeded best in the few localities, like Sallaumines, where anarcho-syndicalism had been strong, while socialists held the lead in former *bastions* of the *vieux syndicat*.²⁰³

Some 600 kilometers to the south, Saint-Junien had been yet another centre of anarchism.²⁰⁴ In the early 1900s, anarchist groups, like *La jeunesse syndicaliste*, or *Germinal,*
had united hundreds of members, mainly glove makers. In the 1920s, the Saint-Junien socialists turned communists and managed to politicize and mobilize the formerly abstaining anarchist following, and also a new generation, for the vote, resulting in a much higher turnout at the polls and a communist victory in 1925. In the early 1920s anarchosyndicalism still exercised considerable influence in the Saint-Junien trade union CGTU, but after 1923 the communists took over. Also, in far away Scottish Lumphinnans communism had been predated by anarchism. In 1908, an Italian immigrant named Storione (or Storian), an anarchist who had worked in mines in Italy, France, Belgium and the west of Scotland, had formed an Anarchist Communist League there, and influenced a number of younger Lumphinnans miners who later joined the Communist Party. Lumphinnans was also the least religious of the British ‘Little Moscows’ described by MacIntyre. In the Rhondda coalfield Spanish migrants arriving from 1907 onwards had introduced anarchosyndicalism, but it is not clear how much this influenced the Rhondda based syndicalist Unofficial Reform Committee, which in 1912 launched an influential call for direct industrial action in a pamphlet titled *The Miners’ Next Step*. We have less detailed information on the German cases, but religious indifference seems to have played a role there too. For Penzberg Tenfelde reports a “ganz überwiegend katholische Prägung bei gleichzeitig großer innerer Distanz zum Katholizismus”, also “in Gestalt großen Zulaufs zur Freidenker-«Gemeinde»”. In protestant Selb religious practice was already very low before World War I, compared to other parishes in the region. For Mössingen it seems relevant that it was an isolated protestant enclave within catholic surroundings, which in majority had voted liberal instead of confessional before World War I, before turning socialist. Communism in the Longwy region did not so much evolve from local traditions, but the more so from its Italian heritage. Italian migration, arriving from about 1900 onwards,
originated from the so called red belt in Northern and Central Italy, which already before the First World War had a socialist orientation, and later turned to the PCI. Because of this origin many labour migrants had an orientation to the left already, although only a minority had been expelled or exiled for political reasons: anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists before the War; communists after fascism coming to power (1922).213 In Villerupt most Italians came from Marche and Umbria,214 from Fabriano in Marche for instance, where, according to Noiriel, there had been an ancient tradition of workers’ militancy.215 In the second generation relationships with Italian villages of origin remained.216 Successive waves of migration seem to have brought different attitudes toward the church, but in the end, like in Italy, most communist voters in the Longwy region combined participation in catholic rites de passage (baptism, first communion, marriage, burial) with an a-religious or even anticlerical attitude.217 In Halluin, the first generation of Flemish migrants - arriving from an overall catholic region - had not abandoned religious practice, and in the interwar period there was still a sizeable number of catholic trade unionists.218

**Conclusion: isolated but embedded countercultures**

Historical research on the communist movement has often focused on organizational structures and doctrines, emanating from, or in opposition to, its central commando-post Moscow, or on its position in the wider labour movement. Only recently attention has been given to its diversified structures of support. The French political scientist Sawicki summarized the results of French socio-historical research of this kind in shorthand:

Le communisme […] n’est pas parvenu à conquérir un quasi-monopole de la représentation ouvrière en imposant «son» idéologie de l’extérieur (de Moscou, d’Ivry,
de Rome …), mais en cristallisant des aspirations utopiques préconstituées et véhiculées notamment par le syndicalisme et l’associationnisme ouvriers mais aussi paysan.  

In this light, the nickname ‘Little Moscows’, suggesting that small place communism was just a local reflection of a uniform and universal Moscow-led communist movement, was completely off the mark. Historical and sociological research on the national, regional and local implantation of communist parties has made clear that, during its existence, communism has been a social movement of specific moments and specific places. The history of small place communism shows that it has inspired and activated people to build their own ‘counter community’ at grass roots level. It is also clear, however, that these could only emerge in very specific local circumstances. I therefore agree with Julian Mischi, who in his recent study in this field prefers to speak about the *structuration locale* above *implantation*, because this would suggest “une organisation qui viendrait de l’extérieur, d’en haut, pour s’établir, s’implanter dans un territoire…”.

220 Communist presence in each locality of my sample had specific backgrounds, both historical and structural, and can be explained by a combination of different local characteristics. Following the concept of *structuration locale* we should perhaps attach more significance to specific local combinations or a cumulation of causes (in the sense of Gunnar Myrdal) than to a set of uniform conditions.

I am also aware that the comparative ecological approach in this paper tends to construct quasi-synchronical similarities and to neglect the diachronical structuration of each case. The timing of communist implantation, which I identified in my introduction as ‘part of the explanation’, has not really been considered properly. The literature on specific places I used does provide clues for the importance of certain events to explain specific chronologies,
for instance what might be called constituent strikes, but I decided to skip these stories (as the paper is long enough as it stands), and leave it to an inventory of common characteristics.

My approach does not allow to conclude that local characteristics found in this research resulted in communist success everywhere such characteristics could be found. It can only provide an inventory of possible factors as a tool for future research in other places and countries. Nevertheless, with this reservation in mind, there are interesting commonalities to be found in the *structuration locale* of communism, at least in the examples studied in this article, which may explain why people in these places were receptive for communist policies and ideas. They can be summarized under three headings: geographical location; socio-economic structure; and past traditions, mostly dating from the period before World War I (table 2). Some of my places were really isolated, in a very hostile surrounding. This was especially so in the German cases of Penzberg, Selb and Mössingen, but also in France a place like Halluin. In other cases this is less clear: they were situated in an area of larger communist implantation. However, at a closer look, also in these areas there were more or less isolated islands which stood out as exceptional places of communist support. At least five of my cases were border towns or villages, situated right at the border. Cross-border relations were sometimes very intense. In these cases, the border situation reflected a peripheral position towards the national state.

The industrial communities in my sample had all emerged from small, mostly agrarian villages, or were knocked up as completely new settlements. Most of them started to grow around 1890 or 1900. These places were isolated, recently developed and mono-industrial boom towns, populated by a wave of migrants from the surrounding countryside or by specifically recruited foreign workers, who had formed mono-occupational, pioneer societies. Second generation migrants turned to communism and build an occupational community based on trade union activity and other associations. Most of them had a militant tradition as a
continuation of earlier socialism, anarchism, or syndicalism; others had a tradition of irreligiousness or religious indifference. The sudden industrial development (*punktuelle Industrialisierung*, to cite Tenfelde) of these places had ‘lifted’ them, so to say, out of the surrounding countryside. As far as the first generation of migrants can be considered ‘uprooted’, it was not politically radicalized, as some conservative social scientist suppose, but these cases did share a disruption of social coherence and social control with the places in my sample with a high degree of detachment from the church. When a second, often locally born generation had settled, representatives aspired to build their own local community by organizing in trade unions and radical political action.

Interestingly, this could happen in different periods, as the French examples make clear. In Halluin it was relatively early, starting already before World War I, and culminating in a turn towards communism just after the War. These were second generation Flemish migrants. In the mining communities in Pas-de Calais, like Sallaumines, it happened fully in the 1930s. These were second generation migrants from the northern French countryside, and later also Polish miners. In the mining communities in the Longwy region, the communist breakthrough came only at the end of the nineteen-fifties and the early nineteen-sixties. These were second generation Italian migrants. For the second generation, militating in, or just supporting the communist party and participating in communist led trade unions and sociability offered opportunities to combine political dissociation with social integration, in this way forming what has been called a local counterculture. Theories suggesting that differences in the degrees of social isolation and occupational homogeneity of working-class groups are major factors influencing variations in political radicalism, can only be valid for communist strongholds if we consider both trade unions and other forms of sociability that enabled communists to transform these isolated, mono-industrial or agricultural localities into ‘occupational communities’.
In this sense, concepts used in this study like *Punktuelle industrialisierung* (‘isolated industrialisation’), ‘occupational community’, ‘isolated mass’, and ‘negative integration’ can be considered elements of the explanation, as far as they refer to the isolated position of the ‘Little Moscows’ in their immediate surroundings. Metaphors used to designate these places - *citadelle assiégée* (Halluin), *Kommunistennest* (Penzberg), *das rote Insel* (Frauenau), and of course the nickname ‘Little Moscow’ itself - illustrate their political isolation and became part of small place communist identity. At the same time, the degree of isolation has to be put in the perspective of all kinds of supra local relationships, without which local communism would not have emerged. Apart from belonging to an international movement and participating in its national policies, many localities were situated in wider areas of communist support, however unevenly distributed, like Rhondda-East, northern Corrèze, the Longwy region, and the French mining district around Lens. Moreover, the importance of migration in the histories and prehistories of these places indicates that the wider context of social relations cannot be ignored. The way migratory workers in the case of the Bugeat canton had established links with Paris, or Italian migrants in the Longwy region were connected with places of origin in the ‘red belt’ of Italy itself, are examples of the importance of these wider relationships, as are the impact of anarchism introduced by migrants, like Storione in Lumphinnans and Broutchoux (originally from Montceau-les-Mines) in Lens.

The importance of border towns in my sample illustrates the dialectics of isolation and supra local connections. Their peripheral situation accentuated their isolation from national metropolitan centres, but cross-border connections enabled underground political activities, and also mutual influence, as in the cases of Halluin and Menin in Belgium, of the Longwy region and southern Luxembourg, and also in the Czech-German borderland.

It is still not clear, however, to what extent these different characteristics of the communist strongholds in my sample were exclusive, and how far factors identified really
differentiated these from other communities not susceptible to communism. To reach more substantiated conclusions would require major collaborative research efforts and resources I was not able to mobilize. What I can at least hope for is that this first inventory will stimulate comparative research on a wider scale, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

2 Vincent Brousse, Philippe Grandcoing, “Aux origines de deux identités politiques urbaines : Limoges et Saint-Junien”, in *idem* (eds), *Un siècle militant. Engagement(s), résistance(s) et mémoire(s) au XXe siècle en Limousin* (Limoges, 2005), pp. 115-145, 145.


8 Lagrave, “Le marteau contre la faucille”, p. 6. The Vale of Leven (Scotland) was also named ‘Little Russia’: MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, p. 14.


Seraing was the Belgian district with the highest communist vote (32.6 % in 1938; 38 % in 1946; 22 % in 1954), but with 39,622 inhabitants (1946) it can hardly be called small. Places in the Borinage near Mons: Wasmes (25.5 % in 1938), Jemeppe (23.5 %), and in Centre near Charleroi: Roux (26.2 %), were smaller communist strongholds: J. Gotovitch, “Le Parti communiste et les élections communales 1926-1952”, in Les Elections communales et leur impact sur la politique belge (1890-1970) / De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen en hun impact op de Belgische politiek (1890-1970) (Brussels, 1994), pp. 292-308, 298, 304. See also: Suzy Pasleau, La gestion d’une commune en proie aux mutations économiques et sociales: Seraing, 1836-1993 (Brussels, 1998), pp. 164-173.


Several communist personalities from localities in my sample became nationwide trade union leaders, like Arthur Horner (Mardy), Abe Moffat (Lumphinnans), Aberto Balducci (Longwy-region), Marius Vazeilles (Bugeat), Jean Lahaut (Seraing).


Jacques Girault, Sur l’implantation du Parti Communiste Français dans l’entre deux guerres (Paris, 1977); Cahiers d’histoire de l’Institut Maurice Thorez 29/30 (1979) special issue Étudier le PCF.


Hastings, Hallain la rouge, p. 7.


Tenfelde, Proletarische Provinz.


Albrecht Bald, Porzellanarbeiterschaft und punktuelle Industrialierung in Nordostoberfranken. Der Aufstieg der Arbeiterbewegung und die Ausbreitung des Nationalsozialismus im Bezirksamt Rehau und in der kreisfreien Stadt Selb 1895-1936 (Bayreuth, 1991), pp. 245-254; “Ausblick: Punktuell industrialisierte Orte in Bayern (Selb, Penzberg, Röthenbach/Pegnitz, Zwiesel, Schweinfurt) – Versuch eines Vergleiches”; Hartmut Mehringer,

34 Althaus *et al.*, *Da ist nirgend nichts gewesen außer hier.*


38 Morgan *et al.*, *Communists and British Society*, p. 30. According to Williams, *Democratic Rhondda*, p. 182, “Mardy’s Communist history is unique: no other Rhondda settlement had that concentrated intensity of experience”. On the differences in voting behaviour between Mardy and Ferndale see also: MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, p. 182. Compare, however, Francis and Smith, *The FED*, p. 173 nt. 43: “It is not easy, or advisable, to distinguish Mardy as such from Ferndale which also housed Mardy workmen”; and MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, p. 41: “By the beginning of the 1930s Mardy was no longer an area of particular Communist strength and there were other parts of the coalfield [...] where the militants were much stronger”.


41 Serge Bonnet, *Sociologie politique et religieuse de la Lorraine* (Paris, 1972), p. 321: percentages of communist voting in coal mining in the 1960s varied between 5.6 and 12.1 %, in sharp contrast to iron mining, were the PCF gained 70-80 % (nt. 11). Although the coal mines were just about fifty kilometres away, coal
miners were mostly recruited from the Lorraine German dialect speaking population, organized in the Christian trade union CFTC, and anti-communist. See also: Michel Dreyfus, “Alberto Balducci, symbole d’une petite Italie syndicale dans la Lorraine du fer”, in Judith Rainhorn (ed.), Petites Italiens dans l’Europe du Nord-ouest. Appartenentes territoriales et identités collectives (Valenciennes, 2005), pp. 175-192, 183.

42 Boswell, Rural Communism, p 68.

43 Ibidem, p. 43.

44 Ibidem, p. 2.


48 As a young man Menin’s socialist mayor August Debunne had participated in a strike committee in Halluin (1893), together with the ‘founding father’ of Halluin’s socialism, Victor Vandeputte (who, however, after WW I did not follow his fellow socialists into the PCF and went to Paris to become national secretary of the CGT textile union). Cf. Hastings, Halluin la Rouge, pp. 85, 89, 228-229; M. De Rijcke, August Debunne en de werkersbeweging in het arrondissement Kortrijk (Brussels, 1931), p. 66.


50 Hastings, Halluin la Rouge, p. 175.


war in Bayern einmalig. In keiner anderen Stadt […] erreichte sie von 1924-1932 permanent über 25 % der Stimmen”; Bald, *Porzellanarbeiterchaft und punktuelle Industrialierung*.


60 Goes, *Arbeitermilieus in der Provinz*, p. 246. At its highest point in 1930 the KPD reached 43 % in Frauenau (*ibidem*, p. 247). After WW II the KPD was represented until 1956 (*ibidem*, p. 250).

61 Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz*, p. 34.


63 Hastings, *Halluin la Rouge*, pp. 149-150.


S. Bonnet cited in Salque et al., L’anniversaire de Thomas, p. 103.

Stéphanie Kovacs, Communisme et anticommunisme au Luxembourg 1917-1932 (Luxembourg, 2002).

Bonnent, Sociologie politique et religieuse de Lorraine, p. 461 nt. 75. In 1966 21 % of the Luxembourg steelworkers were foreigners, predominantly of Italian descent: ibidem, p. 437 nt. 15. See also Bonnet et al., “Appartenance politique et attitude religieuse dans l’émigration italienne”, pp. 51, 54 : in other Luxembourg communities with a large presence of Italian miners (Sanem, Differdange) the communist vote was as high, or even higher.


Goes, Arbeitermilieus in der Provinz, p. 231.


On the mixed composition of the Rhondda working class in 1911 (the census counted 9,905 persons from other parts of Britain): Francis, Smith, *The FED*, pp. 10-11, 45 nt. 23.


Enclosed by Loch Lomond, the Clyde estuary and the Kilpatrick hills, the Vale was in fact isolated from the Glasgow conurbation southeast of it.


Ibidem, p. 143.


Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz*, p. 213

Ibidem, p. 64.

Ibidem, pp. 34-35.


Althaus et al., *Da ist nirgend nichts gewesen außer hier*, pp. 17, 20.


Brousse, Grandcoing, “Aux origines de deux identités politiques urbaines”, p. 131.


Ibidem, p. 79.
Noiriel, *Longwy*, p. 34.

Ibidem, p. 60.

Ibidem, p. 69.

Ibidem, p. 171. In 1926 it was 9,405; in 1931: 11,005; Salque, *L’anniversaire de Thomas*, pp. 239-246.


*Idem*, *Longwy*, p. 179.

Bonne et al., “Appartenance politique et attitude religieuse dans l’émigration italienne”, p. 60. In Longwy, the PCF gained a majority only in 1979.

Cf. Noiriel, *Longwy*, ch. 7: “La deuxième génération entre en scène”.


Ibidem, p. 357.

Bonne, *Sociologie politique et religieuse de Lorraine*, p. 484.


Morgan, Cohen, and Flinn, *Communists and British Society*, p. 187


Ibidem, p. 409.


Ibidem, pp. 374-375.

Ibidem, p. 458.

Ibidem, pp. 375, 395

Ibidem, pp. 396-397; cf. p. 449: “à Sallaunines le poids de la CGT et secondairement celui du PCF ont accéléré l’intégration sociale des polonais. Confrontée à l’arrivée d’immigrations successives, la ville de Sallaunines par la forte référence ouvrière de la municipalité a présenté des capacités d’assimilation-intégration au sein de la classe ouvrière plus importantes que la ville de Noyelles”.

49


Ibidem, p. 154. The Polish electorate proved not very stable, however: after 1928 the KPD-vote in Polish voting district Bottrop Hölscher declined; in KPD-Hochburg Bottrop Eigen by contrast, characterized by a social-democratic prehistory, the KPD-electorate was very persistent. In 1949 the KPD attracted 42.0 %, and after the ban on the KPD and its resurrection as DKP, in 1969 it still attained 31.3 % here (Ibidem, pp. 234-236).

Hastings, Halluin la Rouge, pp. 194-205.

Ibidem, p. 21.


Ibidem, pp 89, 144 ; cf p. 199.

Ibidem, pp. 144-145.


Ibidem, p. 373.

Ibidem, p .223.

Althaus et al., Da ist nirgends nichts gewesen außer hier, pp. 49, 62, 89, 95.

MacIntyre, Little Moscows, pp. 95, 99, 101, 106.

Bald, Porzellanarbeiterschaft, p. 128.

Eiber, Arbeiter unter der NS-Herschaft, p. 47.


140 *Ibidem*, p. 88.

141 Danthieux, *Le département rouge*, p. 255.

142 Boswell, *Rural Communism in France*, p. 81.


144 Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz*, p. 207.


146 *Ibidem*, p. 460.

147 Danthieux, *Le département rouge*, p. 255.


151 Dreyfus, “Alberto Balducci, symbole d’une petite Italie syndicale”, p. 185.


153 Cited by *ibidem*, pp. 38 and 63.

154 Francis and Smith, *The FED*, pp. 163, 167-170; MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, pp. 36-40. The attitude of Horner was at that time denounced by the Third International as ‘Hornerism’: Williams, *Democratic Rhondda*, p. 185.

155 *Ibidem*, p. 189.

156 MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, pp. 75-76.


167 On Mössingen’s proletarian associational culture: Althaus et al., *Da ist nirgends nichts gewesen außer hier*, pp.110-141: “Arbeitervereine”.


170 *Ibidem*, p. 100.


Boswell, *Rural Communism*, p. 53.


Boswell, *Rural Communism*, pp. 86-89. A typical case of ‘ ecological fallacy’, in my view. His computations can be criticized because they only account for temporary migration in the 1920s, when it had very much declined, and they suppose uniform effects of locally different types of migratory labour and destinations. The much more nuanced analyses of Pérouas on this issue are a case in point.

*Ibidem*, pp. 73-74.

*Ibidem*, p. 70 (based on interviews with PCF veterans).

*Ibidem*, p. 86


Cited by Pérouas, *Refus d’une religion*, p. 75.

*Ibidem*, p. 79.


Cited by *ibidem*, p. 123.

Cited by *ibidem*, pp. 132, 134.

54


199 Hilaire, Une Chrétienté au XIXe siècle?, pp. 795-797.


202 Ibidem, 414.


A general overview of the development of communism in the mining district of Pas-de-Calais from a socialist perspective in: Sawicki, Les réseaux du Parti socialiste, pp. 86-107.


205 Brousse, Grandcoing, “Aux origines de deux identités politique”, pp. 139-140 ; Danthieux, Le département rouge, pp. 259-260.


207 MacIntyre, Little Moscows, p. 54.

208 Ibidem, pp. 157, 162-163.


211 Selb, *Porzellanarbeiterchaft*, pp. 48-49.

212 Althaus *et al.*, *Da ist nirgends nichts gewesen außer hier*, pp. 23-24; see also: Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik*, p. 249.


214 Salque *et al.*, *L’anniversaire de Thomas*, p. 99. As specific hometowns are mentioned: Gubbio, Nocera Umbra, Gualdo Tadino, Fabriano.

215 Noiriel, *Longwy*, p. 171 nt. 16.

216 Ibidem, p. 221.


